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Dionysius counted his men and cried bitterly, "We were
three hundred, but now there are not even enough
Phocaeans to man a penteconter. Spirits cannot move
oars or raise sails."
The Etrusan, by Mika Waltari
(Translated by Lily Leino)
IN=ODUCrON
This note attempts to analyze the military crimes pertaining to
unauthorized absenteeism-absence without leave (AWOL) and de-
sertion. (The latter crime encompasses the elements of the former but
additionally requires the element of intent.) Prior to this analysis, a
brief look should be taken at the scope of the problem: its prevalence,
its motivation, and the rationale for the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions.
Unlawful absence' is certainly the most prevalent of military
offenses,2 so much so in fact that one author has referred to it as an
"occupational disease."8 Although unauthorized (unlawful) absences
accounted for less than half of the offenses in the U.S. Army during
World War I,4 World War II saw a vast increase in the rate of
military absence offenses. Records indicate that over half of the
offenses committed in the Army during World War II were absentee
offenses5 and that 80 to 94 percent of the offenses in the Navy during
this period were unauthorized absences. 6 Recent figures show that the
The terms "unlawful absence," "unauthorized absenteeism," "criminal
absenteeism," and "wrongful absenteeism" as used in this note are meant to encom-
pass all forms of unlawful absence from military service, including "Absence With-
out Leave" (AWOL) and "Desertion." The latter term encompasses AWOL but
additionally requires an intent to abandon the service permanently or an intent to
avoid hazardous duty or important service.
2 R. Evzm=r, MnrrrAr.Y JUsTICE xN Tim Am FoRcEs OF THE UNITED
STATES 48, 202 (1956); Brannon, Book Review, 44 VA. L. BEv. 155 (1958);
Eisman, Book Review, 44 CORNELL L. Q. 629 (1959).
a Sullivan, Book Review, 39 BOSTON U. L. REv. 148 (1959).
4 Lunney, Book Review, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 346 (1958).
5 Id.; Peck, Book Review, 31 So. CALrF. L. REv. 218, 219 (1958); Whitesell,
Book Review, 19 ALA. LAwEmR 201 (1958).
6 Boshes and Herman, Study of the Naval Delinquent by Questionnaire, 38
Cum. L. & Crunm. J. 218 (1947); Snedeker, Developments in the Law of Naval
justice, 23 No=E DAmE LAwYER 1, 9 (1947); Lunney, Book Review, 7 Bu-,x.o
L. REv. 346 (1958). See also, Whitesell, Book Review, 19 ALA. LAWYER 201
(1958). However, the desertion rate dropped from 63 desertions per thousand
soldiers in World War H to 20 per thousand in the Korean War. See testimony
of Lt. Gen. A. Connor, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, before
the House Appropriations Subcommittee released on June 20, 1969, in 67 U.S.
NEws & Wonin REP., July 7, 1969, at 61.
NoTEs
present absentee rate is 29 per thousand.7 This means that there are
50,000 to 65,000 unlawful military absentees a year" which account
for over 80 percent of present military offenses.9 Moreover, these
absences cost the government $100,000,000 a year in official action and
lost time.1 0
Absenteeism may be "prompted by a variety of motives-fear, lazi-
ness, hysteria, or any emotional imbalance."'1 Replying to an inquiry
as to the cause of an increase in the rate of absenteeism in 1969, the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Personnel said: "We are getting more
kooks into the Army for one thing. We are getting more young men
who are coming in undisciplined, the product of a society that trains
them to resist authority."' 2 (He later testified that the desertion rate
in 1969 was less than one-third of the rate during World War II.)' 3
Homesickness, domestic problems, and paternity difficulties may con-
tribute to absenteeism.' 4 It is also generally accepted that the im-
mature and uneducated are prone to absent themselves without
authority.' 5 In any event, when the outward pull exceeds the inward
pull, absence usually occurs. 6
The severity of sanctions for wrongful absence under military law
is presumably based upon the severity of the consequences of such
absence.17 As long as countries find it necessary to maintain armies
7 67 U.S. Nnws & WoRLD RaP., July 7, 1969, at 61.
8 See 73 NEwswEEK, March 17, 1969, at 36; 96 Tanm, Dec. 14, 1970, at 39; 93
Thmr, April 25, 1969, at 20.9 BYRNE, Mmrr~ny LAw 54 (1970).
10 See, Ruher, Combating AWOLism, 9 JAG J. 3 (1955); Whitesell, Book
Review, 19 ALA. LAwYER 201 (1958).
"1 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 91 (1958).
12 Testimony of Lt Gen. A. Connor, supra note 6.
13 Id.
14 See Boshes & Hermann, Study of the Naval Delinquent by Questionnaire,
38 Cm. L. & Cim. J. 218, 224 (1947); Woodbury, Causes for Military Desertion:
A Study in Criminal Motives, 12 Cam. L. & Cmm. J. 213, 217 (1921 ).
Racism may also be a cause of desertion. See 96 TIm Dec. 14, 1970, at 39,
40.
15 Boshes & Hermann, Study of the Naval Delinquent by Questionnaire, 38
Cam. L. & Cam. J. 218, 229 (1947); Woodbury, Causes for Military Desertion:
A Study in Criminal Motives, 12 Cam. L. & Camm. J. 213, 219 (1921).
Perhaps the high absentee rate among uneducated servicemen has recently
prompted the Armed Forces to seek a reduction in their quota of low I.Q.
inductees. See Courier Journal (Louisville), Oct. 26, 1971, § B at 3, col. 1. The
relationship between absenteeism and low education may also be a factor in the
success rate of the services' absentee reprocessing centers such as the Army's Cor-
rectional Training Facility at Fort Riley, Kansas and the Air Force's Retraining
Group at Lowry Air Force Base. The latter facility boasts a success rate of 89
percent. See (Maj. Gen.) Cheney, Report of TJAG-Air Force, 42 JuDrE ADvocATE
J. May, 1970 at 8, 12.
16 Woodbury, Causes for Military Desertion: A Study in Criminal Motives, 12
Cmi. L. & Cram. J. 213, 218 (1921).
17 In order to emphasize the importance of military status to the crime of
(Continued on next page)
KENTucKY LAw jouiNAL
either for defense or aggression, real or imagined, military service will
be regarded as more than a "job."'8 It follows then that, if military
forces are to be regarded as a necessity, the maintance of a sufficient
number of properly disciplined individuals to compose those forces is
essential.19 Moreover, the interrelation of the individual duty to the
protection of the group necessitates the suppression of some individual
liberties. 20 More recently, atomic and technological "advancements" in
warfare have increased the importance of assuring that the individual
soldier remains at his assigned duties.2 Sanctions for wrongful
absenteeisms under military law have been designed, therefore, much
like all military punishment, "not as a curative or therapeutic [meas-
ure], but rather as the 'horrible' example of what can happen to you
if you don't watch out."'
22
HISToRY oF MirrmY ABsrEN= STATuTES
Unauthorized absenteeism is by no means a problem confined to
American armed forces,2 3 nor is it peculiar to modem warfare. Desertion
was a capital offense in time of war under Roman military law, and
peace time desertion was a noncapital crime with the degree of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
wrongful military absenteeism, this crime is often compared to absence from
civilian employment. E.g., R. EvE -r, MARnuiY JUSTICE 1-2 (1956); Prugh
Book Review, 62 Dicm. L. REv. 364 (1958). At least one author has compared
the military offense of absence without leave with the civilian offense of vagrancy
the former being "objectionable absence' and the latter being "objectional
presence." Wurfel, Book Review, 33 NoERE DAm LAWYER 659 (1958). However,
in view of the rationale presented for sanctioning wrongful military absence (i.e.,
the individual absence greatly harms the group) perhaps it would be more appro-
priate to compare the military criminal offense with the civilian criminal offense
of non support of the family or desertion of the family. See R. CLAPnK, THE LAW OF
Dom~sxc RELATIONS § 6.5 (1968); R. PERaNs, CIudnmAL LAW 604-06 (2d ed.
1969).
18 Wheat, Desertion, 12 JAG J. 9 (June, 1958). See also M. EDWARDS & C.
DEcKER, THE SOLDmR AND THE LAW 4-5 (5th ed. 1949); R. EvEmt, MnrrARY
JusTIcE 1-2 (1956).
19 A. AviNs, THE LAW OF AWOL 33 (1957); Address by James L. Buckley to
the National Press Club, July 14, 1971, in 37 VrrAL SPFEcHEs 642, 644 (1971).
20 "In the military, b necessity, emphasis must be placed on the security of
the group rather than on the value and integrity of the individual." Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 39 (1957). See also, G. GLENN & A. ScHmLLER, THE ARMY AND =
LAW 1-2 (1943). This is not to say however that the individual soldier is com-
pletely without protection of individual rights. E. BYRNE, MmrrARY LAw 3 (1970).
21 Green, Book Review 56 MicHr. L. REv. 833 (1959); Prugh, Book Review,
62 DICK. L. REv. 364 (1958). See also Avins, "Important Service' in Military Law,
110 PENN. L. REv. 684, 658 (1962).
22Maj. Gen. Rulewitch (U.S.M.C. Ret.), Book Review, 44 A.B.AJ. 970
(1958). The author of this note is neither advocating nor repudiating the rationale
for imposing criminal penalities on wrongful military absentees. Rather, an attempt
has been made to merely present a brief overview of the existing rationale for
such sanctions.2 3 See Lunney, Book Review, 7 BU.FALo L. REv. 346 (1958).
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punishment depending on the time, place and circumstances.2 4 In
1385 A.D., the Articles of War of Richard II cautioned: "[L]et no one
be so hardy as to remove himself, or quit his quarters, on any account
whatsoever, under pain of forfeiture of horse and armour, and his body
to be in arrest, and at the King's will."2 5 Likewise, horse and armour
could be lost if one dared to venture on "an expedition by night or by
day, unless with the knowledge and by the permission of the cheiftain
of the battail in which he is [located]"26 Nor did one dare absent his
watch "on pain of having his head cut off."
27
In July of 1419, King Henry V at his headquarters at Mantes,
France, initiated his Ordinances of War, the twenty-fourth section of
which provided penalties "[flor departying from the oste withoute
leve."28 Three years later in 1422, The Statutes and Ordinances to be
Keped in Time of Werre-a revised version of Henry V's Ordinances
of War-added further restrictions,29 not unlike those Articles of Rich-
ard HI.30 The 1422 Statutes and Ordinances prohibited the abandon-
ment of lodging once assigned,31 and further provided that "no man
make no ridying by day ne by night but by the license and knowledge
of the chevestens of the battaille."
3 2
During this time, Sweden had also been developing a codified
system of military laws to combat military truancy. Under his Articles
24 Avins, The Development of the Concept of Military Desertion in Anglo-
American Law, 4 MELBOURNE L. REv. 91 (1963).2
5 A TICLES OF WAn OF MICHABD I, art. V (1385). These articles are printed
in full in W. WnriraoP, MArrAY LAw AND PnEcEnxmrs 904-06 (2d ed. 1920)
[hereinafter cited as Wnrmaop].2 0 Id. art. XIV.
27 Id. art. XX. A further caution against quartering oneself other than by
assignment of the herbergers appears at XXV, id. art. XXV.2 8 ODInANCEs or WAR MADE By KiNG HENRY V AT MAWNT § 24 (1419),
quoted in A. AviNs, THE LA-w OF AWOL 35 (1957) [Avins obtained these Ordi-
nances from 1 THE BLACK BoOK oF THE ADmaRALT 472 (T. Twiss ed. 1871).]
Section 24 provided:
Also that noman departe from the stale withoute leve & licence of
his lord or maister, uppon the peyn that he that otherwise departeth to
be arreste & in the warde of the marshall & at the K ynges wille of hys lyff;
and also to lose alle his wynnyng of that day, reserved to this lord or
maister the thridde of his wynnyng, and to the lord of the stale surplus
of the same wyrnyng wonne by hym that same day, and so from day to
day til the ordinance be kepte. Id.29 A. Avis, TE LAw PF AWOL 85 (1957). E hereinafter cited as AvINs].
30 Notes 25-27 supra.
31 THE STATUTEs AND ORDnnNc s TO BE KEPED IN Tnmr, OiF WEBEE § 5
(1422) cited in Avms at 85.
32 Id. at § 32; AviNs at 36.
Other early military articles prohibiting unauthorized absences include the
Ordinances of Warre of Henry VIII (1813), the Lawes and Ordinances Militarie
of Robert, Earl of Leychester (1586) The Lawes and Order of Warre of the Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland (1638), and the Earl of Esseexs Laws and Ordinances of
Warre (1642). Avirs at 36.
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and Military Lawes to be Observed in the Warres,33 King Gustavas
Adolphus in 1621 listed at least twenty offenses pertaining to ab-
senteeism.3 4 The crimes of missing movement,3 5 failure to repair,36
and avoiding hazardous duty37 were all covered. Under Adolphus's
Articles not only could individual soldiers be punished for their
abandonment as in earlier military articles, but provisions were also
included to punish entire regiments, troops and companies which
refused to advance and remain engaged with the enemy.
38
Under James II, England again revised its military laws in 1688.
39
The first British Military Act of 1689 specifically used the word
"desert"40 and provided that those offenders "shall suffer death or
such other punishment as by a court-martial shall be inflected."4 '
Since the American Colonies used the British Military Act of 1689 as a
model for their own military laws,42 it came as no surprise that the
first American Articles of War,43 executed on June 30, 1775, were
modeled44 after the British Articles of War4 in force at the beginning
of the Revolutionary War. The authors of the early American Articles
33 Articles and Military Lawes to be Observed in the Warres, CODE OF
ARTICLES OF KING GUSTAVAS ADOLPHUS OF SWEDEN (1621). These articles have
been translated and printed in WARD, ANrMADEvERSIONS OF WARRE (1639) and
are reprinted in WINTRmoP at 907-18.
34 Id. arts. 49, 51-64, 78, 107, 130 & 131.
35 Id. arts. 53, 54 & 57.
36 Id. art. 52.
37 Id. arts. 55, 56, 58-60, 62-64 & 66.
38 d. arts. 58, 64, 66. Of the remaining articles, 49 and 51 pertain to
abandoning watch; Article 61 prohibited unauthorized absences on "any occasion
of service"- Article 78 demanded that "every man shall be contented with that
Quarters tlat shall be given him . . ."; Article 107 cautioned: "No souldier is to
forsake his colours, and to put himself under the entertainment of any other
Colonell or Garrison, or to ramble about the Countrey without he hath his
Coloners Pass . . ."; Articles 130 and 131 were directed at officers and forbade
their authorizing leave for their subordinates or themselves without the permission
of the "Generall chiefe Commander" or "Gouvernour."
39 See RULES AND ARTICLES FOR THE BETTER GOVERNMENT OF HIS MIAJESTIES
LAND-FoRcEs IN PAY arts. XX, XXII, XXVII, XXX, XXXII, XXXV (1688). The
entire text of James II articles may be found under the title ARTICLES OF WAR OF
JAMES II in WINTHRoP at 920-28.
40 AN ACT FOR PUNISHlNG OFFICERS OR SOLDIERS WHO SHALL MUTI-NY OR
DESERT THEIR MAJESTYES SERVICE (1689) is cited in toto in WINTnrop at 929-30.
41 Id.42 AviNs at 36. Compare TiE BRITISH MUTIN ACT (1689) reprinted in
WINTImoP at 929 with MASSACHUSErTS ARTICLES OF WAR (1775) reprinted at
WINTimoP at 947. See also BEcawrrH et al, LAwFUL ACTIONS OF STATE MILrrARY
FORCES 144 (1944).
43 AMEmCAN ARTICLES OF WAR (1775). [These articles are reprinted in
WTHRmoP at 953.]4 4 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL ix (1917) [hereinafter cited as M.C.M.
(1917)]. See also AviNs at 37.
45 THE BRiTISi ARTICLES OF WAR (1965) as reprinted in W'TRoP at 931,
were officially entitled: RULES AND ARTICLES FOR TnE BE-TERMoENT OF COVERsr-
MENT OF OUR HORSE AND FOOT GUARD, AND ALL OTHER OUR FORCES IN OUR KING-




of War,46 like their British predecessors, enumerated a variety of
wrongful absences as separate offenses. For example, chaplains were
specifically required not to absent themselves; 47 soldiers were also
prohibited from being found one mile from camp without leave;
48
and officers could be prosecuted if they dared to "lie out of' their
"quarters, garrison, or camp."49
The American Articles of War of 1917 consolidated several of the
previous absentee provisions found in the 1874 Articles of War50 and
reworded the provisions on desertion.51 Although the 1920 revision of
the Articles of War introduced many changes in court-martial pro-
cedure,52 articles 28 and 58 (desertion) and 61 (absence without
leave) remained unaltered.5 3 In 1951, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice54 became effective and again consolidated and modified the
wording of the desertion and absence without leave (AWOL) articles.55
Subsequent alterations in the Code have not affected these provisions.
Today these punitive articles read as follows:
Article 85. Desertion
(a) Any member of the armed forces of the United States
who-
(1) without proper authority goes or remains absent from his
place of service, organization, or place of duty with intent to re-
main away therefrom permanently; or
(2) quits his unit or organization or place of duty with intent
to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service; or
(3) without being regularly separated from one of the armed
forces enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another one
of the armed forces without fully disclosing the fact be has not
been so regularly separated, or enters any foreign armed service
except when authorized by the United States; is guilty of desertion.
4 6 ATiCLEs OF WAR (1775); ADDITIONAL ARTICLES OF WAR (1775); ARTICLES
OF WAR (1776); AMIucAN ARTICLES (1786); ARTCLEs or WAR (1806), 2 Stat.
359; ARTICLES OF WAR (1874), 18 Stat. 280.4 7 ArTmLs OF WAR § I art. 4 (1776); ARTICLES OF WAR § I, art. 4 (1806),
2 Stat. 859, 360.4 8
AuTICLES OF WAR XVI (1775); ARICLES OF WAR § XIII, art. 1 (1776);
AuTTCLES OF WAR § I, art. 41 (1806), 2 Stat. 359, 365; ARTICLES OF WAR art. 34
(1874), 18 Stat. 230, 233.
49 ArTCLES or WAR XVII (1775); ADDrroNAL ARTICLES 9 (1775); ARTICLES
or WAR § XIII, art. 2 (1776); ARTiCLES OF WAR, § I, art. 42 (1806), 2 Stat. 359,
365; ARTICLES OF WAR, art. 43 (1874), 18 Stat. 230, 234.5 0 See M.C.M. 308 (1917); Compare ARTICLES OF WAR arts. 31-35 (1874),
18 Stat. 230, 233 with ARTICLES OF WAR art. 61 (1917), 39 Stat. 650, 660.
51 Compare ARTICLES OF WAR arts. 47, 48, 49 (1874), 18 Stat. 230, 234 with
ARTICLES oF WAR arts. 28, 58, 107 (1917), 39 Stat. 650, 655, 660, 667.
52 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTAL vii (1928) [hereinafter cited as M.C.M.
(1928)].
53 See ARTICLES OF WAR arts. 58, 61 (1920), 41 Stat. 787.
54 64 Stat. 108 (1950).
55 See F. WEiNER, THE UaNiFOrm CODE OF MIArr.RY JuSTiCE 197-99 (1950).
1972]
KENTUCKY LAw JouiAL
(b) Any officer of the armed forces who, having tendered his
resignation and prior to due notice of the acceptance of the same,
quits his post or proper duties without leave and with intent to
remain away therefrom permanently is guilty of desertion.
(c) Any person found guilty of desertion or attempted deser-
tion shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war,
by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct,
but if the desertion or attempted desertion occurs at any other time,
by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may
direct.56
Article 86. Absence without leave
Any member of the armed forces who, without proper authority-
(1) fails to go to his appointed place of duty at the time
prescribed; or
(2) goes from that place; or
(3) absents himself or remains absent from his unit, organiza-
tion, or other place of duty at which he is required to be at the time
prescribed;
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.5
7
Tim UNIAwFut ABSENCE
Initiation of the Absence
To establish an unlawful absence there must be proof that the
absence was initiated and that it was without proper authority.5 8
Absence may, and often does, mean that the accused physically
removed himself from the premises of a military installation. However,
the unauthorized divestation of military control is all that is necessary
to establish the prohibited act.59 For example, one could be just as
unlawfully absent by hiding on a military installation as another who
absents himself by walking away from it.6° Neither of these individuals
is performing his duty; neither is amenable to orders; neither had
proper authority for his action; and neither is under military control.
56 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1956).
5710 U.S.C. § 886 (1956).58 United States v. Krutsinger, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 237, 85 C.M.R. 207 209
(1965); United States v. Emerson 1 U.S.C.M.A. 43, 1 C.M.R. 43 (1951); E.
BYRN, MmrrAny LAw 54 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bymlu]. See also, MAUA
FoR CouaTs-MAnTinm f 165, United States (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
M.C.M. (1969)] (The present MANUAL For CounTs-MAuImAL was designated for
use by the armed forces of the United States on August 1, 1969 by ExEc. OnDER
No. 11476 dated June 19, 1969); M.C.M. ff 165 (1951); M.C.M. Uf 132 (1928);
M.C.M. 9 412 (1917).
59 Compare cases cited at note 58, supra, with United States v. Sheehan, 1
U.S.C.M.A. 532, 4 C.M.R. 124 (1952) and United States v. Van Lierop, A.C.M.
5-2953, 4 C.M.R. 758 (1952) and United States v. Skipper, C.G.C.M.S. 19131, 1
C.M.R. 581 (1951).
60 See generally the discussion of "failure to repair" and "absence without
leave in M.C.M. Uf 165 (1969). See also Avins at 55; United States v. Anderten 4
U.S.C.M.A. 354, 15 C.M.R. 354 (1954).
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Not only may an absence be initiated actively, but the divestation
of control may occur in a physically passive manner as when the
serviceman fails to appear at his appointed place of duty. This
passive absenteeism may be occasioned not only by a failure to report
to a certain place for specific duties (failure to repair)' but also by
a failure to return to the proper station upon the expiration of an
authorized leave.62
It may appear that a passive absentee is no more absent after his
failure to report for duty than before he was due to report. However,
this reasoning fails to distinguish between physical distance from a
military authority figure and the divestation of military control. One
who remains home on leave or assignment may be physically removed
from a military commander but he is absent on authorization and, as
such, is still constructively under military control.63 On the other
hand, the wilful refusal to submit to orders altering that assignment
or the intentional refusal to return upon expiration of leave is a wilful
refusal to further submit oneself to military control.64 Therefore,
divestation of constructive military control has been effectuated.
One who is on isolated assignment (for example, a one-man patrol)
or on assignment with a nonmilitary organization has not abandoned
constructive military control as long as he observes the limits of his
assignment.0 5 Likewise, one captured by the enemy has not initiated
an unauthorized absence.66 On the other hand, if while on a non-
military or isolated assignment a soldier abandons that assignment,
military control is divested and he is absent without leave. 1 Similarly,
if a prisoner of war escapes and is reasonably provided with an oppor-
tunity to return to actual military control but refuses to return, he has
abandoned constructive military control and is unlawfully absent.68
At one time it was possible for a serviceman to abandon his leave
by going beyond prescribed distance limits from his duty station.
69
61M.C.M. fI 165 (1969).
62 United States v. Scott, C. M. 358366, 9 C.M.R. 241 (1952); BYRN at 56.
In the Scott case, the accused was convicted of unauthorized absence because he
overstayed his leave to assist an R.O.T.C. officer complete an accident investigation
in which Scott was not directly involved.
63 United States v. Hale, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 157, 42 C.M.R. 342, 349 (1970);
United States v. Bruhn 4 C.M.R. 407 (ABR 1952).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Anderten, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 354, 15 C.M.R. 354
(1954).
65 See id.; United States v. Fischer, A.C.M. 4099, 1 C.M.R. 667 (1951); Avins
at 67.
66 DIGEST oF OpurIoNs oF JuDGE ADvOCATE GENERAL OF THE Amy 1912-
1940, § 416(3) (383.6, Sept. 13, 1918) (1942) [hereinafter cited as DiG. Ops.
1912-1940].
67 See note 65 supra.
68 See note 66 supra.
69 See generally note 66 supra.
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Moreover, one's leave could be revoked without his receiving actual
notice (revocation of leave by law) where, because of extraordinary
circumstances, the serviceman should have no reasonable doubt that
his senior officers desire his return.70 Revocation of leave by law was
the basis relied on by a Navy court-martial to convict one sailor who,
while on authorized leave, failed to return to his ship after the attack
upon Pearl Harbor.71 Fortunately, neither revocation by law nor
abandonment of leave appear to be valid law today.72
The physical inability of a serviceman to return following his leave
may validly negate a charge of AWOL.73 However, this inability must
not be occasioned by the accused's own impropriety or misconduct.74
Thus, an accused who is unconscious in a civilian hospital at the
expiration of his leave is not absent without leave.75 On the other
hand, if a soldier is on authorized leave and apprehended and held by
civilian authorities beyond the termination date of his leave, his mili-
tary absentee status will depend upon whether he is acquitted or
convicted of a civilian crime. If he is convicted of a civilian crime,
the military presumes that his wrongful actions were the cause of his
absence. If he is acquitted, he is presumed to have been unable to
return through no fault of his own and is therefore not subject to
conviction for unauthorized absence.76
While this civilian conviction rule may appear to be a logical
extension of the rationale supporting military absentee law, the doctrine
can be carried to an extreme. For example, in United States v. Myhre,
77
the accused, a minor, was arrested by the New York City police one
morning at 5 a.m. His leave was authorized until 7 a.m. of that same
day. He was held for three months and finally allowed to appear
before the Court of Special Sessions at which time he pleaded guilty
to the charge of "youthful offender" on the advice of his "legal aid
70 See United States v. Edwards, A.C.M. S-10457, 18 C.M.R. 830 (1955);
Avins, The Development of the Concept of Military Desertion in Anglo-American
Law, 4 MELBOuRNE L. REV. 91, 108 (1963).71 AvNs at 89 citing C.M.D. 1-1942, p. 273.
72See United States v. Johnson, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 488, 22 C.M.R. 278 (1956).
See also United States v. Hale, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 42 C.M.R. 342 (1970); Homes,
Book Review, 35 CANADIAN B. REv. 999, 1001 (1957).
7~3 united States v. Arnie, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 514, 22 C.M.R. 804 (1956).
74 UntdStates v. Myhire, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 32, 33, 25 C.M.R. 294, 295 (1958);
DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF TEE JUDGE ADVocATEs GENERAL OF TnE Aiusy 1862-1912
at 15 citing: C. 18764, June 21, 1910; 3694, Jan. 4, 1910; 12524, Apr. 30, 1902;
C. 16966, Mar. 31, 1909; C. 18041, Sept. 7, 1905 [hereinafter cited as DIG. Ops.
1862-1912]. See M.C.M. ff 165 (1969); See also United States v. Daggett, N.C.M.
63-01846, 34 C.M.R. 706 (1963).
75 DIG. Ops. 1862-1912 at 421 (C. 21117, Feb. 25, 1970). See also United
States v. Amie, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 514, 22 C.M.R. 304. United States v. Phillips, N.C.M.
279, 14 C.M.R. 472 (1953).
76 See note 74 supra.
77 9 U.S.C.M.A. 32, 25 C.M.R. 294 (1958).
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lawyer." The civilian court "sentenced [him] to the Elmira Reception
Center for an undefined term not to exceed three years."78 His
"sentence" was then suspended and he was returned to military control.
A court-martial subsequently found him guilty of unauthorized
absence and sentenced him to partial forfeitures of his pay and
allowances, a bad-conduct discharge, and confinement at hard labor
for five months. 7
9
Previously, the Court of Military Appeals had held that, for pur-
poses of impeachment, a juvenile proceeding is not to be considered a
civilian conviction.80 Counsel for the appellant urged that because of
this previous decision in regard to impeachment, the military court
should consider the accused's absence as the result of a civilian
apprehension which did not result in a conviction. Therefore, applying
the civilian conviction doctrine, it was urged that appellant's absence
should have been excused. The court rejected appellants contentions
and held that the absence was occasioned by the appellant's own "will-
ful misconduct." Nor did the fact that New York did not consider an
adjudication of "youthful offender" to be a criminal conviction s'
affect the court's decision to affirm the AWOL conviction. The military
court did not dwell on its rationale for treating the New York non-
criminal adjudication as a criminal conviction, it merely said that the
absence had been the result of the accused voluntarily engaging in a
"prohibited act."
8 2
It is difficult to understand how the civilian conviction doctrine can
deter absence without leave. If the state legislature decides that the
punishments they have provided for crimes within their borders are
sufficient deterrents, why should the military attempt to increase the
punishment for the offense by initiating a charge of unauthorized
absence against a convicted serviceman? This practice may even
encourage extensive and energetic litigation of the most minor civilian
offenses thereby costing both the service and the civilian courts many
lost man hours. This doctrine also encourages a serviceman to flee
from civilian jurisdiction at the first sign of possible apprehension
rather than taking a chance of conviction on a minor civilian charge
followed by a military sentence for AWOL. The irony of this doctrine
is disclosed by the procedure followed when a soldier returns to duty
after fleeing civilian jurisdiction. He may be subsequently returned
to the civilian authorities for prosecution, but his lost time is not
78 Id. at 33, 25 C.M.R. at 295.
79 Id.
8o United States v. Roark, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 279, 24 C.M.R. 89 (1957).
81 See N.Y. CODE Cm,. P. § 913-n (1958).
82 United States v. Myhre, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 32, 25 C.M.R. 294 (1958).
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considered AWOL even if he is convicted.83 It therefore appears that
an AWOL conviction under this doctrine depends not upon whether
the accused was absent through his own fault, but upon whether the
accused can reach a military installation before civilian authorities
apprehend him. The penalty for running too slowly may be a dishonor-
able discharge and confinement at hard labor.84 Finally, it appears
that to allow a court-martial conviction for AWOL under the civilian
conviction doctrine is to contradict the holding of the Supreme Court
in O'Callahan v. Parker.85 To allow such action is to allow court-
martial jurisdiction and additional punishment for a nonservice con-
nected crime which O'Callahan prohibited. It is no answer to say that
O'Callahan is inapplicable since AWOL is a service connected crime,
because the wilful action could not become a "service connected
crime" until after the accused was apprehended and held beyond his
authorized period of absence.
Duration of the Wrongful Absence
Although desertion and AWOL are completed offenses at their
inception, the duration of the absence is a mitigating circumstance
affecting the extent of punishment.86 Since the duration of an unlawful
absence continues from the divestation of military control until the
return to military control, 7 an unauthorized absence once initiated is
unaffected by an inability to return.88 This is true even where an
unlawful absentee is arrested on a civilian charge and acquitted, or
where he is physically unable to return due to an illness that arose after
the initiation of the unauthorized absence.89 Of course, the inability
83 United States v. Northrup, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 31 C.M.R. 73 (1961);
M.C.M. fI 165 (1969). See also U.C.M.J. art. 14(a).
84 See M.C.M. f1 127c, Table of Maximum Punishments (1969).
85 O'Callan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). In O'Callahan, a sergeant was
convicted by a court-martial for assault, house breaking, and assault with intent to
rape. These crimes were all committed in a civilian hotel while the accused was
on an evening pass and dressed in civilian clothing. The Supreme Court held that
the court-martial had no jurisdiction to try the crimes in question. Because these
crimes were not service connected and were committed off the post while on an
evening pass, the petitioner was entitled to trial by a civilian court. To decide
otherwise would be to deprive him of his constitutional rights to indictment by a
grand jury and to a trial by a petit jury in a civilian court.
86 United States v. Self, C.M. 411882, 35 C.M.R. 557, 561 (1965); United
States v. Posnick, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 201, 203, 24 C.M.R. 11, 13 (1957). But see
Wnrmiop at 255 (describing absence without leave as continuous). See also Dic.
Ops. 1912-1940 § 396(2).
87 See, e.g., United States v. Coates, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 625, 629-30, 10 C.M.R.
123, 127-28 (1953); United States v. Ferguson, A.C.M. S-1708, 1 C.M.R. 767, 769
(1951).
88 United States v. Lovell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 445, 447, 22 C.M.R. 235, 237 (1956);
United States v. Emerson, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 43, 1 C.M.R. 43 (1951); United States v.




to return may be considered as an extenuating circumstance for
sentencing purposes.90 Once an absentee returns to military control
the duration of his unauthorized absence has ceased and any further
unauthorized relinquishment of military control results not in a
continuation of the original offense, but in a second, separate unlawful
act. Of course, the government cannot divide a continuous absence
into several shorter offenses.91
In the event that a termination date for an unauthorized absence
is unascertainable, the Court of Military Appeals has held in United
States v. Lovell9 2 that the accused may be found guilty of only a one
day absence. The argument has been made that where the date of the
accused's return to military control is unascertainable, he should be
presumed to have continued his absence. This argument was dis-
missed by the Court in Lovell with the following reasoning:
The presumption of continuance [of the unauthorized absence]
does not merely flow forward, as the government contends, but it
flows backward. . . At some point the backward flow of the
presumption meets the forward flow. Any attempt to fix that point
is sheer speculation. Consequently, the presumption of con-
tinuance cannot supply the necessary proof of an aggravation.
There must be other positive evidence of the accused's return to
military control.93
The maximum permissible punishment for absence without leave
may increase according to the length of the absence. Although the
Uniform Code of Military Justice has provided that one convicted of
being absent without leave "shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct,"94 the President has placed limitations on the amount of punish-
ment which may be imposed.95 Because of these limitations, one who
is absent without leave for less than three days may be confined at
hard labor for not more than one month. An absence of more than
three but less than thirty days may, upon conviction, result in confine-
ment for six months. Finally, an absence of thirty or more days may
subject a convicted serviceman to one year's confinement at hard labor
and a dishonorable discharge.96 Therefore, the exact determination of
90ld.
91 See United States v. Brown, A.C.M. 13393, 24 C.M.R. 585 (1957), pet.
denied 24 C.M.R. 311 (1957). See also United States v. Smith, C.M. 370313,
15 C.M.R. 438 (1954).
92 7 U.S.C.M.A. 445, 22 C.M.R. 235 (1956).
93 .contra, United States v. Thomas A.C.M. 5027, 6 C.M.R. 646 (1952),
affd (without considering the issue of the duration of the absence), 3 U.S.C.M.A.
161, 11 C.M.R. 161 (1953).
9410 U.S.C. § 886 (1956).




the number of hours an accused was absent may be important in order
to ascertain whether that duration has passed the less-than-three-days
or less-than-thirty days limits. In computing the duration of the
absence, any continuous period of absence less than twenty-four hours
is counted as one day. However, even though departure and return
are proven to have occurred on separate days, in the absence of proof
of the exact hours of both departure and return the accused is pre-
sumed to have departed and returned at exactly the same time of day
on those separate dates. Therefore, if an unauthorized absence is
proved to have been initiated at 6 a.m. (0600 hours) on December 24
and to have been terminated at 11 p.m. (2300 hours) on December
27, the accused has been absent for 89 hours or 4 days. In contrast, if
the proof only establishes an absence from December 24 to December
27, the accused has been absent only 72 hours or 3 days.
97
Termination of the Wrongful Absence
Terinination of the wrongful absence occurs when the accused
returns to either actual or constructive military control. Much like
determining the inception of the absence, the return to military control
is more important in determining the cessation of the absence than is
the physical return to a military organization or installation. A known
absentee who returns in civilian clothes to his organization for a very
short while before departing does not necessarily terminate his unlaw-
ful absence.98 By the same token, it is no longer necessary for an
accused to return to his own organization or service to terminate his
absence.99 Thus, termination of a wrongful absence may occur when a
sailor surrenders to Air Force personnel'O° or when a soldier sur-
renders to a recruiting officer;' 01 of course, the military cannot refuse
to exercise control over a surrendering absentee in order to prolong
his absence.' 02 This is not to say that mere control over an absentee
is of itself sufficient to terminate an absence. Knowledgeable control
is required. Moreover, the knowledge required is not simply knowl-
edge of the accused's name, rank or service number. 03 There must
97See M.C.M. f1 127c(3) (1969). See also United States v. Krutsinger, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 235, 237, 35 C.M.R. 207 (1965).
98 United States v. Self, C.M. 411832, 35 C.M.R. 557 (1965).
99 See United States v. Coates, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 625, 10 C.M.R. 123 (1953);
United States v. Mayer C.G.C.M. 9761, 4 C.M.R. 505 (1952); United States v.
Briggs, A.C.M. S-1783, 2 C.M.R. 653 (1951).
100 Id.
101 United States v. Kitchen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 541, 18 C.M.R. 165 (1955). See
also United States v. Brown, A.C.M. 13393, 24 C.M.R. 585 (1957).
102 United States v. Self, C.M. 411832, 35 C.M.R. 557, 560 (1965).
108 In July, 1969, the armed forces replaced the old service number with the
social security account number (SSAN).
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be a knowledge that the accused is an unauthorized absentee.10 4 There-
fore, the reinlistment and subsequent service by an accused may cause
him to be under physical military control, but it will not serve to
terminate his original absence if the authorities exercising control
over him are unaware of his status.105
Two of the most extreme examples of the knowledgeable-control
requirement occurred during the Korean War. In Korean cities which
contained large troop concentrations, summary courts-martial were
established to try offenders "on the spot" for minor offenses. On at least
two occasions, courts-martial were held in which a soldier who was
AWOL from his unit was convicted on another minor offense. Control
in both cases was obviously exercised effectively over the accuseds and
the courts-martial were informed of the accuseds' names, ranks and
organizations. But, the courts were not aware of their AWOL status.
The Court of Military Appeals held that neither accused had termi-
nated his unlawful absence through this submission to a court-
martial.10 In reaching its decision, the court placed much emphasis
upon maintaining the effectiveness of the transient courts-martial.
"Referral to every soldier's parent organization in order to determine
his status would make difficult if not impossible the prompt and
effective disciplinary action on minor offenses for which these courts
exist .... Here there was neither actual knowledge nor reasonable
opportunity to obtain such knowledge."1o0 Trial by the accused's
parent organization occasions a different result, for then the burden
would have been upon "that organization to know or ascertain his
duty status."108
This decision does not appear completely unreasonable. However,
the court placed a burden upon the accused to disclose his status:
[U]nless an unauthorized absentee makes it known to the court,
they would remain ignorant of his status.... If the absentee dis-
closes his status so that the military authorities have full knowledge
of all the facts, they could not, with propriety, contend that the
absence was not legally terminated.' 0 9
Under this decision, in order for his absence to be terminated the
accused, who is under military control to the extent of his being court-
martialed, is required to volunteer information concerning his status.
10 4 United States v. Self, C.M. 411832, 35 C.M.R. 557, 560 (1965).
105 DI. OPs. 1912-1940 at 266, citing C.M. 157067 (1923).
106 United States v. Branch, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 189, 2 C.M.R. 95 (1952); United
States v. Jackson, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 190, 2 C.M.R. 96 (1952).





But, in volunteering information concerning his status, he is volunteer-
ing information that he is absent without leave. Therefore, to confess
the status is to confess the crime. Further, since the punishment for an
unauthorized absence may increase with the increase of the duration
of the absence, it appears that the accused is being compelled, on
threat of additional punishment, to confess that he has committed that
very crime. Yet, in neither of these cases did the court mention the
implications of their decision on the soldiers' right against self-
incrimination.'1 o
Termination of an unauthorized absence may also occur con-
structively without military authorities exercising direct control over
the absentee. The most typical example of constructive termination
occurs when civilian authorities receive official notice of the absentee's
status and apprehend him pursuant to that notice."'l Regardless of
whether one views such action as a form of agency or determines that
the government is estopped from denying the exercise of military
control,112 the absence has been terminated. Furthermore, when an
accused has been apprehended by civilian authorities on a criminal
charge and proper military authorities are given notice of his AWOL
status and that he is being held for return to actual military control,
the absence has been terminated."13
The receipt of a discharge while in an absentee status may terminate
110 United States v. Branch, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 189, 2 C.M.R. 95 (1952); United
States v. Jackson, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 190, 2 C.M.R. 96 (1952).
Professor Avins has called the decision in Jackson "correct." However, Avins
discussed only the policy rationale for considering the absence continuous and did
not discuss the accused s constitutional rights. AVINs at 75. The drafters of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice were apparently quite concerned that the
serviceman be guaranteed his right against self-incrimination. Article 31 of the
Uniform Code provides:
(a) No person subject to this code shall compel any person to
incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may
tend to incriminate himself.
(b) No person subject to this code shall interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without
first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that
he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which
he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be
used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
(c) No person subject to this code shall compel any person to make
a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the
statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to de-
grade him.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this
article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful
inducement shall be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-
martial. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1956).
"'I United States v. Garner, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 578, 582, 23 C.M.R. 42, 46 (1957).
112 See AviNs at 80.
"3S See United States v. Webster, A.C.M. 15734, 27 C.M.R. 956 (1958).
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that absence.114 In any event, military courts would then have no
jurisdiction over the accused 15 so that his absentee status would be
functionally terminated. However, when an accused remains absent
beyond the expiration date of his original enlistment, he ordinarily
does not receive a discharge. In such cases, the unauthorized absence
continues because Congress has specifically provided that lost time
occurring during an enlistment must be served." 6
DEsEm-oN-THE ExMmTr or TFr
Traditionally, the crime of desertion is established by proving that
the accused was absent without leave and that he intended to remain
absent permanently." 7 The intent to remain away permanently may
be shown to have occurred either at the inception of the unauthorized
absence or at some point within the duration of that absence.""
Normally, the conduct of the accused and circumstances surrounding
his absence must be used to create an inference that he intended to
remain permanently absent. 19 Seldom is direct proof of such an intent
available.
120
Circumstances and actions of the accused, prior to and at the time
of departure, which are often helpful to determine intent may include
proof that the accused was under investigation or awaiting charges at
the time of his absence' 2 ' or that he was undergoing a sentence of
confinement.122 Prior convictions of unauthorized absence may also
114 See Avins at 76.
115 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); United States
v. Vance, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 444, 38 C.M.R. 242, 244 (1968); United States v. Scott,
11 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 29 C.M.R. 462 (1960). See also Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 284 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo,
361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisharn v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
116 10 U.S.C. § 972 (1958). See also Taylor v. Resor, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 405, 42
C.M.R. 7 (1970); United States v. Klunk, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 92, 11 C.M.R. 92 (1953);
W. AycocK & S. WUBFEL, MArrAuY LAw UNDER TE UNIFORM CODE OF Mimrr~ny
JusTicE 230 (1955).
17 M.C.M. U 164a (1969).
118 See United States v. Turner, C.M. 41449, 37 C.M.R. 508 (1966) pet.
denied 37 C.M.R. 471 (1966); United States v. Welsh, C.M. 408894, 33 C.M&.
502 (1963); United States v. Haliburton, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 694, 26 C.M.R. 474
(1958); United States v. Fisher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 270, 22 C.M.R. 60 (1956); United
States v. Ferretti, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 323, 3 C.M.R. 57 (1952).
"19 Fratcher, Presidential Power To Regulate Military Justice, 34 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 861, 882 (1959). See also United States v. Fisher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 270, 22
C.M.R. 60 (1956); United States v. Peterson, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 317, 3 C.M.R. 51
(1952).
120 Id.
121 United States v. Miller, C.M. 409688, 33 C.M.R. 563 (1963); United States
v. Rothman, A.C.M. 17226, 30 C.M.R. 872 (1960).12 2 See United States v. Fisher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 270, 22 C.M.R. 60 (1956);
United States v. Barrett, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 294, 12 C.M.R. 50 (1953).
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indicate a pattern of consistent refusal to submit to military control. 23
However, there must be a logical connection between the prior con-
viction and the alleged intent; an isolated conviction for a 35 minute
AWOL is of doubtful value to prove an intent to remain permanently
absent.124 The length of the absence,125 the method of termination
(arrest or surrender),'12 6 the distance traveled,'2 7 and the direction of
travel' 28 may shed light on the intent of the accused. Whether the
accused attempted to secret his absence by lying; 29 discarding military
identification; 130 wearing civilian clothes;' 3 ' and using assumed names
or erroneous identification, 132 may all be indicative of his specific
intent to remain permanently absent. Of course, each of these circum-
stances may be weighed in light of the other circumstances. For
example, a ten hour absence may be a desertion where the accused
escaped from confinement and was thereafter apprehended. 133 By
the same token, an absence following an investigation of fraud and
bigamy may be an AWOL offense rather than desertion where the
accused had a previously exemplary record including prior honorable
discharges.
34
The 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial provided that mere unre-
butted proof of an extended unauthorized absence was sufficient to
123 United States v. Wallace, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 146, 41 C.M.R. 146 (1969);
United States v. Webb, C.M. 412523, 35 C.M.R. 593 (1965); United States v.
McPherson, C.M. 409400, 33 C.M.R. 542 (1963); United States v. Powell, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 64, 11 C.M.R. 64 (1953).
124 United States v. Renshaw, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 52, 25 C.M.R. 314 (1958).
125 United States v. Wiedeman, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 365, 36 C.M.R. 521 (1966).
126 United States v. Wiedeman, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 365, 36 C.M.R. 521 (1966)-
United States v. Montoya, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 210, 35 C.M.R. 182 (1965); United
States v. McPherson, C.M. 409400, 33 C.M.R. 542 (1963); United States v.
Rodgers, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 664, 25 C.M.R. 168 (1958); United States v. Graham, 5
U.S.G.M.A. 265,17 C.M.R. 265 (1954).
127 See United States v. Miller, G.M. 409688, 33 C.M.R. 563 (1963); United
States v. Schaible, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 107, 28 C.M.R. 331 (1960).
128 Compare United States v. Peterson, I U.S.C.M.A. 317, 3 C.M.R. 51
(1952); United States v. Ferretti, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 323, 3 C.M.R. 57 (1952).
129United States v. Miller, C.M. 409688, 33 C.M.R. 563 (1963); United
States v. McNeill, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 383, 9 C.M.R. 13 (1953).
130 See generally cases cited at note 132 infra.
11 See United States v. Huguley, C.M. 421057, 41 C.M.R. 608 (1969);
United States v. McPherson, C.M. 409400, 33 C.M.R. 542 (1963); United States
v. Powell, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 11 C.M.R. 64 (1953).
Obtaining a military "job" by re-enlisting while AWOL may also establish the
requisite intent. Moreover, such re-enlistment is not a separate offense but merely
a method of proving intent. United States v. Johnson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 297, 17 G.M.R.
297 (1954); See also United States v. Huff, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 22 C.M.R. 37 (1956).
132 See United States v. Kirby, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 517, 37 C.M.R. 137 (1967);
United States v. Wright, C.G.C.M.S. 19614, 6 C.M.R. 491 (1952); United States
v. McCrary, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 1, 1 C.M.R. 1 (1951).
133 United States v. Turner, C.M. 41449, 37 C.M.R. 508 (1966) pet. denied
37 C.M.R. 471 (1966). Compare with United States v. Hamilton, C.M. 422126,
41 C.M.R. 724 (1970).
'34 United States v. Rothman, A.C.M. 17226, 30 C.M.R. 872 (1960).
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establish an inference of an intent to desert and could therefore justify
a desertion conviction.135 However, in United States v. Cothern, the
Court of Military Appeals struck down a conviction of desertion where
the law officer'1 3 gave an instruction based upon that Manuals pro-
vision. 1 37 The court said: "Neither the law officer nor the Manual for
Courts-Martial... may substitute a period of absence for the necessary
ingredient of intent-regardless of the character of such a period."138
The court founded its opinion upon the following statement by the
United States Supreme Court in Morrissette v. United States:139
[A] presumption which would permit but not require the jury to
assume intent from an isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion
which the jury should reach of its own volition. A presumption
which would permit the jury to make an assumption which all the
evidence considered together does not logically establish would
give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. 140
The Cothern decision was widely criticized as contrary to existing
military case law and as an erroneous interpretation of Morrissette.'
4 1
However, as was later noted by the Court of Military Appeals, to
allow a deserter's conviction to stand solely on the basis of an absence,
which was not "satisfactorily" explained, has the effect of shifting the
burden of proof on the accused to establish his innocence.'L4 Cer-
tainly, if the accused did in fact intend to desert and thereby remain
absent for a prolonged period, it is not unreasonable to require the
government to provide some evidence, of the type previously men-
tioned, to establish that intent. Otherwise, if it is impossible for the
government to discover any such evidence despite a much prolonged
'35 M.C.M. II 164a (1951).
130 Under the 1951 MANUAL.. FOR CoURTs-MRImaL the "Law Officer" was an
officer on active duty who was a member of the bar "of a Federal Court or of the
highest court of a State of the United States and who [had been] certified to be
qualified for duty by the judge Advocate General of the armed force of which he
[was] a member." His duties approached those of a civilian judge in that he
advised the court on issues of law and instructed the court on the elements of the
offenses charged. M.C.M. flI 4e, 73 (1951). The term "Law Officer" is no longer
applicable to the military court system. The Law Officer has been replaced by the
Military Judge. M.C.M. f111 4e, 73 (1969).
1a3United States v. Cothem, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 158, 23 C.M.R. 382 (1957).
138 Id. at 161, 23 C.M.R. at 385.
230 342 U.S. 246 (1952). In Morrissette, the Supreme Court held that
crimidnal intent is an essential element of the crime of "knowing" conversion of
government property. The civilian defendant in this case had been convicted of
knowingl removing bomb casings from an Air Force iractice bombing range.
Apparenty the defendant thought the casings were abandoned. Id.
140 342 U.S. at 275.
141 See, e.g., Avins, Prolonged Absence as Proof of Intent to Desert, 38 Cm.
KENTr L. REv. 103 (1961); Fratcher, Presidential Power to Regulate Military
Justice: A Critical Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 861, 881 (1959); Comment, Military Law, 46 Grn. L. J. 354 (1957).
142 United States v. Soccio, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 477, 24 C.M.R. 287 (1957).
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absence, how can it be said that the accused's intent to desert has
been established beyond a reasonable doubt?14
3
The Intent to Avoid "Hazardous Duty" or "Important Service"
In 1920, the Articles of War broadened'44 the crime of desertion
by the addition of the following provision:
Any person subject to military law who quits his organization or
place of duty with the intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk
important service shall be deemed a deserter.145
In substance, this addition remains today.146
The offenses of "unauthorized absence with the intent to avoid
hazardous duty" and "unauthorized absence with the intent to shirk
important service" share many common attributes. Both require an
unauthorized absence.147 Moreover, the absence must be accompanied
by a specific intent to avoid a specific duty or service. 148 Merely
establishing that the accused did avoid such duty or service by his
absence does not necessarily prove desertion.149 Therefore, it is neces-
sary to prove that the accused knew that he was likely to be required
to perform such duty or service. 50 Constructive knowledge is not
sufficient.' 51 In order to establish the accused's knowledge of his
assignment to hazardous duty or important service, the government
may show: that the accused had received a personal notice or warning
of the assignment; 152 that his organization had received notice as a
group and that the accused was present when such notice was
tendered;153 or that other circumstances surrounding the unauthorized
14s Critics of the Cothern decision have apparently removed their criticism
from the courts to the legislature. In May, 1970, the Judge Advocate General of
the Army reported that "the Army is seeking legislation to give the military judge
exclusive power over sentencing and also legislation to make a sixty-day ANVOL,
desertion without proof of intent." Maj. Gen. K. Hodson, Report of T.JA.G.-Army,
TnE JUDGE ADvOCATE J., May, 1970 at 7.
144 United States v. Hemp, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 280, 284, 3 C.M.R. 14, 18 (1952).
145 Id. at 284, 3 C.M.R. at 18. See also M.C.M. 1928, 209 at art. 28. A
relatively extensive history of these forms of desertion appears in Avins, A History
of Short Desertion, 13 Mm. L. REv. 143 (1961).
146 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1956).
147 Compare United States v. Apple, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 592, 10 C.M.R. 90 (1953)
with United States v. Deller, 3 U.S.G.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.R. 165 (1953).
148 Compare United States v. Apple, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 592, 10 C.M.R. 90 (1953)
with United States v. Taylor 2 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 9 C.MJI. 19 (1953).
149 See generally United States v. Stewart, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 58, 41 C.M.R. 58
(1969) United States v. Stabler, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 125, 15 C.M.R. 125 (1954); U.S.
v. Apple, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 592, 10 C.M.R. 90 (1958); United States v. Taylor, 2
U.S.C.M.A. 389, 9 C.M.R. 19 (1953).
150 See United States v. Land, A.C.M. 19767, 37 C.M.R. 921 (1967).
151 See cases cited at notes 148-50 supra.
152 See M.C.M. fT 164a (1969).
153 Compare United States v. Squirrell, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 146, 7 C.M.R. 22
(1953) with M.C.M. ft 164a (1969).
absence indicated that the accused knew of his assignment to hazardous
duty or important service.
154
Despite their similarities, hazardous duty and important service
are not correlative.' 55 The determination of what constitutes "hazardous
duty" may appear relatively simple and usually is. For example, there
is little doubt that duty involving violent armed confrontation with the
enemy is hazardous.5 6 However, the Court of Military Appeals has
held that hazardous duty is not to be limited to front line con-
frontations. A medic in a reserve combat platoon may avoid hazardous
duty by his absence.157 Moreover, avoiding duty in the Korean War' 58
or the Vietnam War' 59 does not necessarily mean the avoidance of
hazardous duty in the military criminal sense. In hopes of clarifying
the situation, one author has advocated a functional approach based
upon mortality and casuality rates; he would define as "hazardous"
only those duties which have high mortality or casuality rates.160 The
court has not as yet accepted this proposal.
The determination of whether a particular service or assignment is
"important" is a question of fact which depends upon the circum-
stances of the particular case.161 Nevertheless, it requires "something
more" than ordinary service to be considered important.162 Marching
from South Carolina to "Camp Knox," Kentucky, is not "important
service."103 And, contrary to the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial,164
all foreign duty is not necessarily important service within the
meaning of this offense.16 5 While all military service may in a general
sense be important in time of war, this does not mean that all Korean' 6
or Vietnam duty 17 has been or is "important" within the meaning of
the desertion provisions.
'54 Compare United States v. Cook, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 223, 8 C.M.R. 23 (1953)
with United States v. Deller, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.R. 165 (1953) and United
States v. Taylor, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 9 C.M.R. 19 (1953).
'55 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 49, 39 C.M.R. 46 49 (1968).
156 United States v. Squirrell, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 146, 7 C.M.R. 22 (1953); United
States v. Brooks, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 88, 1 C.M.R. 88 (1951).
157 United States v. Squirrell, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 146, 7 C.M.R. 22 (1953).
'58 United States v. Apple, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 592, 10 C.M.R. 90 (1953).
'59 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 39 C.M.R. 46 (1968).6 0 Avins, Hazardous Duty in Short Desertion: The Formulation of Military
Law Concepts 4 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 129 (1963).
161 United States v. Merrow, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 265, 34 C.M.R. 45 (1963); United
States v. Hyatt, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 23 C.M.R. 291 (1957).
162 United States v. McKenzie, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 34 C.M.R. 141 (1964).
163 DiG. Ops. 1912-1940 § 416(5) at 266.
164 M.C.M. ff 164a (1951).
165 Compare United States v. Taylor, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 9 C.M.R. 19 (1953)
with United States v. Hyatt, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 23 C.M.R. 291 (1957).
166 United States v. McKenzie, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 34 C.M.R. 141 (1964).
167Compare United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 39 C.M.R. 46 (1968)
with United States v. McKenzie, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 35 C.M.R. 141 (1964).
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In determining what service is "important," the court has found a
wide range of duties to fall under that category. Ordinary training
may not be "Important,"6 8 but "basic" training is.169 The duties of a
rifleman in Korea are not necessarily important,170 but the duties of a
cook on an ice breaker involved in Operation Deep Freeze in the
Antarctic may be "important."17' Service in Vietnam is not necessarily
important,172 but the service performed by a warehouseman on Guam
in support of air operations over Vietnam has been held to be "im-
portant."17 3 In determining that basic training is "important," the test
applied was one of congressional intent. Previously, such training did
not appear to be considered important. 7 4 However, the Court of
Military Appeals held that because of the passage of the 1951
amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act 7 5
which required four months of basic training prior to the assignment of
personnel to foreign duty, Congress intended basic training to be
"important."'76
Apparently, the importance of the overall operation in which the
accused is participating does aid in determining whether the indi-
vidual's service is important:17 Moreover, "[lthe test is clearly not
whether the individual's service is 'criticar to the success of the mission,
but whether he is performing an essential function, for it is obvious
that the absent cook.., was not critical to the mission." 78
DEFENSE OF THE UNLAWFuL ABSENCE
There are three defenses which, because of their peculiar relation-
ship to criminal absenteeism, merit a brief discussion. These are: the
expiration of the statute of limitations; an honest mistake of fact; and
the constructive condonation of the wrongful absence.
The Statute of Limitations
In peacetime the statute of limitations for absence without leave is
168M.C.M. ff 164a (2) (1969).
169 United States v. 0 Neil, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 416, 12 C.M.R. 172 (1953); United
States v. Deller, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.R. 165 (1953).
170 See United States v. McKenzie, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 34 C.M.R. 141 (1964).
171 United States v. Merrow, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 265, 34 C.M.R. 45 (1963).
17 2 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 39 C.M.R. 46 (1968).
173 United States v. Land, A.C.M. 19767, 87 C.M.R. 921 f 1967).
174 See DiG. Ops. 1912-1940 § 385 at 193; see also, Avins 'Important Service"
in Military Law, 110 PENN. L. BEv. 685 695 (1962).
175 Universal Military Training and Service Act § 4(a), as amended 65 Stat
78, 50 U.S.C. § 454(a) (Supp. V. 1951).
176 United States v. Deer, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.R. 165 (1953).
177 See id.; United States v. Merrow, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 265, 34 C.M.R. 45
(1963).
178 United States v. Land, A.C.M. 19767, 37 C.M.R. 921 (1967).
two years; for desertion, it is three years.179 Since neither AWOL nor
desertion are continuing offenses but are complete as of their incep-
tion, 8 0 the statute may run prior to the accused's return to active duty.
However, such is not usually the case since the mere receipt of sworn
charges by the officer exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction
serves to toll the statute.181 The statute of limitations is not applicable
to absences occurring in "time of war."182 In this regard, the definition
of "war" is more dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the
particular conflict than upon a congressional declaration. 1' Thus, not
only was the statute of limitations suspended for absences occurring
in World War J,14 but there was also a similar suspension in the
Boxer Rebellion 8 5 and the Korean Conflict. 8 6 Likewise, the Vietnam
War has served to suspend the statute. 8
7
Mistake of Fact
In order for "mistake of fact" to be a valid defense to an unauthor-
ized absence, the mistake must be both honest and reasonable. The
usual appellate discussion revolves around the reasonableness of the
mistake. 8 The fact that an accused received a letter from his com-
manding officer which led the accused to believe his leave was still in
existence may be a reasonable mistake. 8 9 On the other hand, one who
allows himself to be drummed out of the service by an obviously illegal
court-martial composed solely of enlisted men has not necessarily
justified his mistaken belief. 90 "Reasonable" also means that the
accused's misapprehension must have been a valid defense had the
179 10 U.S.C. § 843 (1956).
180 See, United States v. Welsh, C.M. 408894, 33 C.M.R. 502 (1968); United
States v. Posnick, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 201, 24 C.M.R. 11 (1957); United States v. Ray,
7 U.S.C.M.A. 378, 22 C.M.R. 168 (1956).
181 United States v. Arbie, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 292, 36 C.M.R. 448 (1966); United
States v. Busbin, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 661, 23 C.M.R. 125 (1957).
182 10 U.S.C. § 843(f) (1956). See Aycock & Wurfel, MrrYaiy LAw UNDErt
THE UNI'OMI CODE OF MirrrArY JusTicE 138 (1955).
183 See United States v. Ayers, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954).
184 DIG. OPs. 1912-1940 at 266.
185 DiG. Ops. 1862-1912 at 173.
186 United States v. Ayers, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954); United
States v. Anderten, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 354, 15 C.M.R. 354 (1954).
187 United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968).
188 United States v. Scheunemann, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 479, 34 C.M.R. 259 (1964);
United States v. Holder, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 213, 22 C.M.R. 3 (1956). Accord, United
States v. Farris, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 499, 26 C.M.R. 279 (1958). See also United States
v. McCluskey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 20 C.M.R. 261 (1955); United States v. Per-
ruccio, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 28, 15 C.M.R. 28 (1954).
189 See United States v. Corder, A.C.M. 1354, 1 A.F. (C.M.R.) 715 (1949)
discussed in AviNs at 184.
'
00 See generally DIG. OFs. 1862-1912 at 400.
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facts been as he believed. 91 To illustrate, if an accused went absent
on a Wednesday but thought it was Thursday and had no authority
to absent himself on either Wednesday or Thursday, his mistake of
fact is no defense to his unlawful absence. The difficulty of determining
what is "reasonable" was recently demonstrated in United States v.
McCrown.192 In this case, the accused missed a formation allegedly
because he was unaware that his watch stopped while he was in the
Post Exchange (PX). In upholding the conviction, the Court of
Military Appeals inferred that "the accused's failure to make the
formation did not result from a reasonable belief that he had 'plenty
of time' to make it." This inference was apparently based upon the
distance from the PX to the formation area; the accused's failure to
return immediately to the formation after checking his watch; and his
failure to again check his watch until his return.193 In a vigorous
dissent, Judge Ferguson echoed the sentiments of stopped watch
victims everywhere:
It is a rare person, indeed, who has not been late for an appoint-
ment or meeting of some sort, because of reliance on a timepiece
which has failed to function properly. Since the Court of Military
Review accepted the accused's testimony as honest, I believe that
it erred in finding it not reasonable. 194
It appears, therefore, that the reasonableness of the mistake of fact is
primarily a factual determination that may depend more upon intuition
than specific legal guidelines.
Condonation
If an officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over a
deserter knowingly restores that individual to active duty without
reservation, that officer has condoned the accused's actions and thereby
barred further trial on that offense.19 5 This defense is based upon the
assumption that the commander is responsible for maintaining dis-
cipline and that if he sees no grave disciplinary problem there is no
reason to try the offender. 196 The Court of Military Appeals has con-
191 See R. PERKINs, CGBIMNAL LAW 826 (1957); Meagher, Book Review, 5
M.. L. REv. 129, 130 (1959).
192 20 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 43 C.M.R. 249 (1971).
193 Id. at 410, 43 C.M.R. at 250.
194 Id. at 412, 43 C.M.R. at 452.
195 United States v. Scott, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 650, 20 C.M.R. 366 (1956); United
States v. Huff, C.G.C.M. 9837, 19 C.M.R. 603 (1955); United States v. Pascal,
C.M. 851951, 3 C.M.R. 379 (1952); United States v. Palsenberger, C.M. 350621,
3 C.M.R. 157 (1952); United States v. Minor, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 497, 4 C.M.R. 89
(1952).
196 See AviNs at 268.
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strued the defense of condonation quite narrowly so that its practical
effect is limited. Not every officer or authority can condone desertion;
it must be a general court-martial convening authority.197 Moreover,
this general court-martial convening authority must have full knowl-
edge of the accused's actions. 198
Although all the elements of AWOL are included within desertion,
and condonation is a complete defense to desertion, condonation is
not a defense to AWOL. 9 The rationale for this exclusion leaves
much to be desired. One writer has implied that to include AWOL
under the condonation defense would be to encourage the incarceration
of those minor offenders who are awaiting trial.2 0 This assumption
has no merit, for commanders may always restore offenders to duty
with the reservation that there is no bar to trial. Even the Court of
Military Appeals has expressed some doubt as to the wisdom of the
exclusion but has refused to broaden the rule "without legislative
sanction."201 At one time, American courts apparently accepted
condonation as a bar to AWOL.2 0 2 Indeed, British military law, after
which our absentee laws were patterned,20 3 may include any military
crime under the condonation defense.2 0 4 It has been suggested that the
only reason American military courts refuse to include AWOL within
the condonation defense is that early American writers were slack in
restating the law in early manuals, and subsequent manual authors
197 See cases cited at note 195 supra.
Article 22 U.C.M.J. lists the qualifications of a general court-martial con-
vening authority.
(-a) General courts-martial may be convened by-
lthe President of the United States;
(2) the Secretary concerned;
(8) the commanding officer of a Territorial Department, an Army
Group, an Army, an Army Corps, a division, a separate brigade, or a
corresponding unit of the Army or Marine Corps;
(4) the commander in chief of a fleet; the commanding officer of a
naval station or larger shore activity of the Navy beyond the United
States;
(5) the commanding officer of an air command, an air force, an air
division or a separate wing of the Air Force or Marine Corps;
(6 any other commanding officer designated by the Secretary con-
cerned; or
(7) any other commanding officer in any of the armed forces when
empowered by the President.
(b) If any such commanding officer is an accuser, the court shall
be convened by superior competent authority, and may in any case be
convened by such authority if considered desirable by him. 10 U.S.C. §
822 (1956).
198 See cases cited at note 195 supra.
199 United States v. Minor, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 497, 4 C.M.R. 89 (1952).
200 See generally Avis at 269.
201 United States v. Minor, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 497, 498, 4 C.M.R. 89, 91 (1952).
202 See Dic. Ops. 1862-1912 at 16. See also AviNs at 268.
203 See notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text.
204 Cf. Regina v. Durkin [1953] 2 Q.B. 864.
19721] NOTES
KENTUCKY LAW JOUBNAL
lazily copied those errors.205 While this may be plausible, it is a
distasteful rationale for denying the defense.
CONCLUSION
Superficially, it appears most unconscionable to subject any Ameri-
can citizen 2°6 to criminal penalities for merely travelling from one part
of the country to another. Such action is particularly heinous when
the citizen is a homesick minor "going home to mother," or a concerned
husband visiting his expectant wife. However, with the military
defense oriented value system under which our world functions, such
criminal sanctions may be rationalized on the basis of societal neces-
sity. In any event, the dilemma of individual freedom versus societal
necessity should be carefully analyzed. Attempts to subvert individual
freedoms (including the freedom to travel) should be cautiously re-
stricted to those instances where the rationalization for the limitations
apply. More specifically, if societal necessity demands that a citizen
subject himself to military control in order to maintain a highly disci-
plined defense system, sanctions should not be imposed to restrict his
freedom to travel unless those sanctions serve to maintain such a
system. Present military law on the civilian conviction doctrine and the
defense of condonation allows punishment for unauthorized absence
without supporting the rationalization behind that punishment. In
both of these areas, sanctions may be imposed for one who absents
himself from military control even though his punishment provides no
deterrent for that or other absences.
Criminal absenteeism under military law has been undergoing
evolutionary changes for several centuries. And, while decisions such
as Cothern and O'Callahan are doing much toward the maintenance
and advancement of the balance between individual rights and group
necessity, there is still room for growth. Not only is there a need for
reappraisal of the civilian conviction doctrine and the defense of
condonation, but the courts would do well to reweigh the knowledge-
before-termination requirement, with particular emphasis upon the
individuars right against self incrimination.
Sammy S. Knight
2 05 AviNs at 270.
206 The serviceman continues his status as citizen throughout his military
career. See, e.g., Note, Military Law: Its History, Administration and Practice, 85
L. Q. REv. 478 (1969).
Although citizenship is not divested via entry into military service, the status
of the individual does change in that he is thereby subjected to the laws and
customs governing the armed forces. In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890); In re
Grimley 137 U.S. 147 (1890); G. GLENN & A. ScHILLER, THE Army AND THE
LAw 3 (1943).
